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ABSTRACT
Digital technologies present museums with tremendous
opportunities to increase public access to the arts. But the
longstanding “permissions culture” entrenched in the museum
community—in which licenses are obtained for the use of
copyrighted materials regardless of whether such uses are
“fair,” such that licenses are not legally required—likely will
make the cost of many potential digital projects prohibitively
expensive. Ending the permissions culture is therefore critically
important to museums as they seek to connect with diverse
audiences in the Digital Age. In this issue brief, I argue that such
a development will require clear and context-specific
information about fair use that enables museum professionals to
better understand the appropriate boundaries of fair use, and
that a community-based code of best practices—like the College
Art Association’s recently released Code of Best Practices for
Fair Use in the Visual Arts—is likely the best means to achieve
this.
INTRODUCTION
Digital technologies make it possible for museums to connect
with diverse audiences in new and unprecedented ways. 1 Today art
enthusiasts and novices alike can digitally walk through an exhibition
without ever leaving their home;2 step into a museum and learn about
unfamiliar works using smartphone applications and interactive displays;
†
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and curate their own digital collections of a museum’s works. 3 Such
possibilities, if they are to be turned into realities, will doubtless require
the reproduction of an enormous quantity of copyrighted images and
other materials. But if museums continue their current licensing practices
into the future, the cost of doing so likely will make many of these
endeavors prohibitively expensive.4
For years, a “permissions culture” has pervaded the visual arts
community.5 Reproductions of copyrighted materials have been licensed
almost reflexively, without serious consideration as to whether obtaining
a license to reproduce a work was legally necessary or not. 6 If these
compulsory licensing practices continue, they will substantially inflate
the costs of digital projects—and in turn, the quantity and quality of
digital projects will likely decline as resources allocated to their
development are expended on unnecessary licenses. 7 Ending the
permissions culture is therefore critically important to museums as they
seek to connect with diverse audiences in the Digital Age.
This issue brief proceeds as follows. In Part I, I explain that fair
use doctrine—which permits unauthorized, unlicensed reproduction of
copyrighted materials under certain circumstances—is essential to
fulfilling American copyright law’s ultimate objective: the promotion of
widespread access to knowledge and ideas. I then consider how the
doctrine’s flexibility is at once a virtue—making it adaptable to new
ideas and technologies—and a vice—producing uncertainty about what
constitutes a permissible fair use, and ultimately chilling its exercise in
the museum community. In Part II, I advocate that many common
museum activities incorporating copyrighted materials are fair, despite
the fact that many of these materials are licensed. This incongruity is
largely attributable to the uncertainty that surrounds fair use doctrine,
and to the risk-averse practices of individual institutions that,
collectively, have entrenched a permissions culture within the industry.
In Part III, I argue that shifting the balance toward fair use would enable
museums to better implement digital projects, and that this shift would
require context-specific information about fair use that would enable
museum professionals to better understand the appropriate boundaries of
3
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fair use. I further argue that community-based codes of best practices—
like the College Art Association’s recently released Code of Best
Practices for Fair Use in the Visual Arts—are likely the best means of
doing so. I then evaluate the CAA Code, and conclude that despite its
imperfections, it is a significant step towards ending the permissions
culture in the museum industry. Its ultimate success, however, hinges on
a critical mass of museum professionals deciding to put its guidelines
into practice.

I. PROMOTING THE PROGRESS OF SCIENCE AND THE USEFUL ARTS:
A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF COPYRIGHT AND FAIR USE
United States copyright law was devised to fulfill a utilitarian
purpose: “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”8

A. Copyright is a Social Bargain with a Utilitarian Aim
The United States Copyright Act of 1976 protects “original
works of authorship [that are] fixed in any tangible medium of
expression” through a grant of copyright ownership that provides its
owner with certain exclusive rights.9 This grant of copyright, however, is
not an end in itself.10 Rather, its ultimate aim is to stimulate progress in
the arts and sciences for the enrichment of the public.11
Copyright is therefore understood as a social bargain between
creators and the public. 12 It seeks to strike “[a] balance between the
interests of [creators] in the control and exploitation of their [works] . . .
and society’s competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information,
and commerce.”13 To achieve this balance, copyright law grants authors
and inventors “a limited and temporary monopoly” over their creations,
providing them with certain fundamental rights over their works for a
designated period of time.14 This limited monopoly is intended to serve
as both an incentive and a reward for creating new works.15 In exchange,

8

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
10
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Pierre Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1107–
11.
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ARTS 8 (2015) [hereinafter “CAA CODE”].
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Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
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JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND
66 (2008).
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Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
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the public benefits from access to new works, and ultimately from an
enriched public domain at the end of these works’ copyright terms.16

B. Fair Use is Essential to Copyright’s Utilitarian Aim
To realize copyright’s utilitarian aim, a number of limitations are
placed on the exclusive rights of creators that allow others to make
certain uses of their protected works without authorization. 17 These
limitations are as important as the rights they define;18 as giving creators
absolute control over their works would “limit, rather than expand,
public knowledge” in some circumstances.19
The doctrine of fair use, which permits unauthorized copying in
some circumstances, is one such limitation. Fair use is codified in
Section 107 of the Copyright Act, which provides:
[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes such
as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research,
is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether
the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use
the factors to be considered shall include—(1) the purpose
and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.20

Fair use is an affirmative defense to copyright infringement.21 As
such, a party asserting fair use has the burden to prove that his use is
fair.22 Perhaps for this reason, fair use is sometimes characterized as “a
narrow and grudging defense against an otherwise valid case for
copyright infringement.23 But as the statute provides, “the fair use of a
copyrighted work [. . .] is not an infringement of copyright” at all.24 The

16

Id.
See BOYLE, supra note 14, at 68–69 for an explanation of additional
limitations on intellectual property rights.
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Id. at 69.
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Leval, supra note 11, at 1110.
20
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
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Boyle, supra note 14, at 66.
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See id.
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doctrine thus serves as a “crucial safety valve in the copyright system,”25
allowing for the development of new technologies and new expressions
of creativity that make use of existing copyrighted material that—
without fair use—would otherwise be prohibited infringement.26

C. Fair Use is a Flexible Doctrine
Fair use developed as an “equitable rule of reason” through the
common law process.27 When Congress codified the doctrine through the
enactment of Section 107, it declined the opportunity to take a “rigid,
bright line approach to fair use.”28 Instead, it endorsed “the purpose and
general scope of the judicial doctrine [of fair use]” with the intention that
courts remain “free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations.”29
As such, there is neither a “generally applicable definition” of
fair use, nor a set of “exact rules” to determine whether a use is fair.30
Rather, Section 107 provides “a very broad statutory explanation of what
fair use is,” and lists “some of the criteria applicable to it.” 31 In its
preamble, Section 107 provides some examples of purposes that may be
considered fair uses.32 These examples, however, are “illustrative and not
limitative,” and “provide only general guidance about the sorts of
copying that courts and Congress most commonly ha[ve] found to be fair
uses.”33 A claim of fair use therefore requires individual consideration
against the factors set out in the statute. The results must then be
“weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright.”34
The flexibility of fair use is one of its greatest strengths. Had
Congress instead codified it as a “laundry list of exemptions,” it would
have lacked adaptability, and would have quickly become “frozen and
irrelevant in the face of innovation and social change.”35 As it stands, fair
use accommodates invention, creation, and free expression without
25

PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, RECLAIMING FAIR USE: HOW TO PUT
BALANCE BACK IN COPYRIGHT 80 (2011).
26
Anthony Falzone & Jennifer Urban, Demystifying Fair Use: The Gift of the
Center for Social Media Statements of Best Practices, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y
U.S.A. 337, 338 (2010).
27
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 n.31
(1984) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65–66 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5679; S. REP. No. 94-473, at 65–66 (1975)).
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
33
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577–78 (1994).
34
Id. at 578.
35
Falzone & Urban, supra note 26, at 338.
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requiring constant modification of the underlying framework of
copyright law.36

D. Fair use is an uncertain doctrine
While the flexibility of fair use is an essential element of its
continued vitality, it is also critiqued as one of the doctrine’s greatest
shortcomings. 37 Flexibility means uncertainty. Standing alone, fair use
doctrine means “very little without an understanding of the customary
practices and habits around the kind of use in question.”38 And even then,
it can be unclear whether a new use of existing copyrighted material is
likely to be considered fair.39
Recent scholarship has recognized distinctive patterns among
fair use cases that may be helpful in evaluating whether a use is likely to
be considered fair.40 But these broad evaluations, as Jennifer Rothman
explains, do not adequately reassure users in individual cases. 41 “There is
a big difference between knowing that given categories of uses tend to be
favored for fair use . . . and knowing how a particular case will turn
out.” 42 And in many instances, the case law points in different
directions. 43 This unpredictability has produced a chilling effect on
creativity and innovation across many industries, including museums and
36

Id. In contrast, § 108 provides specific exceptions to intellectual property
rights for libraries and archives in certain clearly defined situations. See 17
U.S.C. § 108 (2012). While this specificity provides helpful clarity, it has
severely impaired § 108’s ability to adapt to the demands of the digital age,
resulting in widespread calls for its revision. See generally Melissa A. Brown,
Copyright Exceptions for Libraries in the Digital Age, 74 C. & RES. LIBR. NEWS
199 (2013).
37
See generally Lawrence Lessig, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES
TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL
CREATIVITY 99 (2004) (ebook) (explaining that “the fuzzy lines of
[fair use] law, tied to the extraordinary liability if lines are crossed, means that
the effective fair use for many types of creators is slight”).
38
AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, supra note 25, at 24.
39
See Leval, supra note 11, at 1107 (explaining that “[d]ecisions [in fair use
cases] are not governed by consistent principles, but seem rather to result from
intuitive reactions to individual fact patterns.”).
40
See generally, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2537 (2009); Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair
Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549 (2008); Michael J. Madison,
A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1525
(2004).
41
Jennifer E. Rothman, Copyright’s Private Ordering and the “Next Great
Copyright Act,” 29 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1595, 1602–03.
42
Id.
43
Id.
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the broader visual arts community.44 As a result, the promise of fair use
has in many ways gone unfulfilled.45

II. MUSEUMS UNDER-EXERCISE THEIR
FAIR USE RIGHTS TO THEIR OWN DETRIMENT
Museum professionals make frequent use of copyrighted
materials. For instance, curators include images of works of art in
materials produced for exhibitions, and museum educators use images
when teaching school groups. Nevertheless, there is surprisingly little
case law on copyright issues within the museum context.46 The relevant
case law, however, provides strong authority that copyrighted images
and other materials may be used fairly for transformative,
noncommercial purposes, such as the production of educational
materials. 47

A. Many Museum Uses are Fair
In this section, I present an example of an increasingly typical
museum use of copyrighted materials, and evaluate that example against
the statutory fair use factors listed in Section 107 of the Copyright Act.48
Imagine that a museum professional working at a nonprofit art museum
plans to use images of copyrighted works of art in an educational
application about a modern artist for a smartphone or other digital
device.49 The hypothetical application includes extensive original written
and audio educational commentary about many of the artist’s most
famous works, thus transforming the images from mere renderings of the
works of art into helpful visual aids in a multimedia educational essay.
To allow visitors to closely view the works discussed, it includes images
that exceed the small, low-resolution “thumbnail” size that was for many
44

See Falzone & Urban, supra note 26, at 340.
Id.
46
AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, supra note 5, at 20–23.
47
Id. (referencing, among other cases, Prince v. Cariou, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir.
2013); Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir.
2006); Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006)); see also Perfect 10 v.
Amazon.com Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.,
336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003); Nunez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18
(1st Cir. 2000).
48
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
49
This hypothetical assumes that the museum already has high-resolution digital
images of the necessary works, which is not always the case. Museum
professionals without access to a high-resolution image may have to pay an
artist, an artists’ rights organization, or another museum to obtain one. This is an
access fee. Unlike a licensing fee, an access fee is not rooted in copyright law.
As such, payment of an access fee may be required regardless of whether an
intended use is fair.
45
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years considered the industry standard image size when relying on fair
use.50 The application is to be made available for free download from the
museum’s website.
This example is not intended to be limited to smartphone
applications, or even just to uses of images of copyrighted works of art.
Rather, it is intended to illustrate the types of concerns likely to arise
when evaluating any use of copyrighted materials within the museum
context for transformative, noncommercial purposes.51
1. The First Factor: The Purpose and Character of the Use
Section 107 requires consideration of a number of factors that
must be weighed together to determine whether a particular use is fair.
The first factor considers “the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes.”52 It looks at the profit or nonprofit character of
the secondary use, as well as whether it is educational. Nonprofit and
educational secondary uses tend to weigh in favor of a finding of fair
use.53 It also considers the degree to which the original is transformed
through the secondary use. It asks whether the secondary use “adds
something new” to the original, “with a further purpose or different
character.”54 While “not absolutely necessary” for a finding of fair use,
“the more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance

Am. Ass’n. of Museum Dirs., POLICY ON THE USE OF “THUMBNAIL” DIGITAL
IMAGES IN MUSEUM ONLINE INITIATIVES 2 (2011), https://perma.cc/R6JT5MTU. This policy was developed by the American Association of Museum
Directors (AAMD) in 2011. Id. The AAMD revoked this policy in 2016 because
it had become “obsolete.” Am. Ass’n. of Museum Dirs., Policy on the Use of
“Thumbnail” Digital Images in Museum Online Initiatives (Jan. 25, 2016),
https://perma.cc/K22B-2QXD. It was replaced with more flexible fair use
guidelines that encourage museum professionals to use images that are
appropriate in size for the particular use at issue. See generally Am. Ass’n. of
Museum Dirs., GUIDELINES FOR THE USE OF COPYRIGHTED MATERIALS AND
WORKS OF ART BY ART MUSEUMS (2016), https://aamd.org/sites/default/files/
document/Final%20Fair%20Use%20Guidelines%20060116.pdf
[hereinafter
“AAMD FAIR USE GUIDELINES”].
51
The analysis that follows could be applied more or less equally to the use of
copyrighted works of art on educational webpages, in print or digital teaching
materials, and other noncommercial museum uses with some sort of scholarly or
educational purpose. See AAMD FAIR USE GUIDELINES, supra note 50, at 15–18
for additional examples of such uses, including exhibition catalogues and blog
posts.
52
17 U.S.C. § 107(a).
53
See id.
54
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
50
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of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against [such] a
finding.”55
Here, the nonprofit, educational purpose for which the
application is created weighs in favor of a finding of fair use. Its
transformative character also weighs in favor of such a finding; it
includes significant textual information that contextualizes and
comments on the images of the works it includes, “[adding] something
new, with a further purpose or different character.”56 As such, this factor
weighs heavily in favor of a finding of fair use.
2. The Second Factor: The Nature of the Copyrighted Work
The second factor, “the nature of the copyrighted work,”57 asks
whether the original work is within “the core of intended copyright
protection.” 58 Because copyright only protects creative expression (as
opposed to mere facts or ideas), the more creative a work, the greater the
scope of copyright protection it is provided.59
Here, the works of art themselves are “original[] creative
expression,” and thus are afforded the fullest extent of copyright
protection. This protection extends to the derivative digital images of the
works at issue here.60 But here, as in so many other cases, the second
factor “does little more than confirm that the works at issue are protected
by copyright and may only be used ‘fairly.’”61 It weighs neither in favor
nor against a finding of fair use.
3. The Third Factor: The Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used
The third factor looks at “the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.” 62 This
factor calls for both a quantitative and a qualitative evaluation. 63 The

55

Id.
Id.
57
17 U.S.C. § 107(b).
58
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
59
See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 346–50
(1991). In contrast, less creative works (e.g., a phone book ordering individuals
alphabetically by last name) are afforded less protection under the copyright act,
if they are afforded any protection at all. See id.
60
17 U.S.C. §106 (2012).
61
Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Doc. Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1405 (6th Cir.
1996).
62
17 U.S.C. § 107(c).
63
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
56
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more important the part or the greater the amount of the original
reproduced, the less likely the secondary use is fair.64
Nevertheless, there is no categorical rule against copying a work
in its entirety or its most important part.65 As long as the secondary user
copies only as much of the original as necessary, then this factor does not
weigh against a finding of fair use.66 This point is particularly relevant
when considering copyrighted images. Images, unlike text, cannot be
adequately quoted or summarized. 67 In recognition of this fact, courts
have repeatedly held that copying entire images for transformative
secondary uses is fair.68
Here, it is necessary to include images of the works in their
entirety so that users can understand the application’s commentary. As
the application’s commentary discusses the details of the works, it is
appropriate that the images included are large enough that users are able
to perceive those details. This factor therefore weighs neither in favor nor
against a finding of fair use.
4. The Fourth Factor: The Market Effect on the Copyrighted Work
The fourth fair use factor, “the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work,” 69 considers
whether the secondary use serves as a competing substitute for the
original, thereby denying the copyright owner significant profits if
potential purchasers acquire the secondary work in lieu of the original.70
It inquires not only about the extent of market harm caused by the
particular secondary use at issue, but also about the effects of

64

See id. at 587–89.
See id. at 589.
66
Id.
67
See generally Stephen E. Weil, Fair Use and the Visual Arts, or Please Leave
Some Room for Robin Hood, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 835, 840 (2001).
68
See, e.g., Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007)
(holding that the use of entire copyrighted images was reasonable in light of the
purpose of a search engine) and Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th
Cir. 2003) (same); see also Nunez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18
(1st Cir. 2000) (holding that the reproduction of entire photographs in a
newspaper was a fair use when the news story concerned the content of the
photographs themselves).
69
17 U.S.C. § 107(d) (2012).
70
Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 233 (2d. Cir 2015).
65
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“unrestricted and widespread conduct” of the same sort.71 If a secondary
use is noncommercial, it gives rise to a presumption that a use is fair.72
The fourth factor also considers the effect of the use on the
potential market for derivative works. 73 In the context of our
hypothetical, this includes the market for licensing digital images of the
works of art. The extension of copyright protection over derivative works
“reflects a clear and logical policy choice.”74 Congress determined that a
creator’s “right to control and profit from the dissemination of her work
ought not to be evaded by conversion of the work into a different
form.” 75 But the impact on the potential licensing market cannot be
determinative. If a court concluded “in every case that potential licensing
revenues were impermissibly impaired simply because the secondary
users did not pay a fee for the right to engage in the use, the fourth fair
use factor would always favor the copyright holder.” 76 Thus when
assessing the harm to the market for derivative works, the relevant
inquiry is whether the use is otherwise fair when compared against the
other factors.
Here, allowing a museum professional to make fair use of
images of the works of art in this context arguably benefits the market
for the original works. An image of a sculpture reproduced on an iPad
obviously does not serve as a substitute for the sculpture itself.
Furthermore, an application like the one at issue here likely augments the
visibility and reputation of the artist whose work it features, thereby
stimulating demand for his original works of art.77
Allowing fair use in this instance would, however, deprive the
copyright owner of a potential licensing fee for the use of the image. But
because the application is otherwise a fair use, this should not be
determinative. 78 Furthermore, even if reliance on fair use becomes
widespread in this context, a substantial market for derivatives of the
copyrighted work would remain in place. Those who wish to use the
71

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994).
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449–51
(1984).
73
Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 223.
74
Id.
75
Id. As such, an artist has a copyright interest in his painting as well as a
coextensive interest in any images that represent that painting. Id.
76
Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 613 (2d Cir.
2006).
77
See Olav Velthuis, TALKING PRICES: SYMBOLIC MEANINGS OF PRICES ON THE
MARKET FOR CONTEMPORARY ART 108–09 (2005) (discussing how institutional
recognition from museums can stimulate demand for an artist’s works).
78
See id.
72
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images in ways that are clearly not fair—such as the unimaginative,
commercial reproduction of the work in its entirety on shirts or coffee
mugs—will continue to have to pay licensing fees for such nontransformative, commercial uses. The copyright owner will therefore
continue to enjoy substantial revenue from a robust licensing market.
5. Weighed Together in Light of the Purposes of Copyright
The four statutory factors are not to “be treated in isolation, one
from another.” 79 Rather, all four are “to be explored, and the results
weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright.”80 As such, this
analysis requires consideration of both “the benefit the public will derive
if the use is permitted and the personal gain the copyright owner will
receive if the use is denied.”81
Here, this calculation weighs strongly in favor of a finding of fair
use. The copyright owner’s interest is admittedly damaged, but it is not
devastated; and the public benefit is substantial. By eliminating
unnecessary costs from the creation of digital projects like the one
imagined here, it is more likely that these projects would be attempted,
and that the results would provide the public with more insightful, more
comprehensive, and more innovative approaches to a diverse range of
art. 82 These gains would be particularly substantial for distant and
traditionally underserved audiences, as digital projects would allow those
unable to visit a museum to access its collections. 83 As such, the
imagined application and other, similar uses clearly advance one of
copyright’s most essential purposes—the “promotion of broad public
availability of . . . [the] arts”—and are almost certainly fair.84
a. Museum Professionals Under-Exercise Their Fair Use Rights
While many uses of copyrighted materials in the museum
context are fair, museum professionals are generally reluctant to assert
this right. This reluctance stems partly from industry sensitivities.
Museum professionals are concerned with maintaining good
relationships with artists, their estates, and others who own the rights to
79

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994).
Id.
81
Bill Graham, 448 F.3d at 613 (quoting MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180,
183 (2d Cir. 1981)).
82
See Lessig, supra note 37, at 113–15 (explaining that while technological
advances have made it possible to create widespread access to scholarly and
creative materials, efforts to do so are impeded by the high costs imposed by the
current copyright regime).
83
See G. WAYNE CLOUGH, BEST OF BOTH WORLDS: MUSEUMS, LIBRARIES, AND
ARCHIVES IN A DIGITAL AGE 67–68 (2013) (ebook).
84
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432 (1984).
80
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their works. 85 As such, museum professionals are disinclined to take
actions that could damage those relationships, such as refusing demands
for licensing fees. 86 Moreover, museum professionals revere artistic
creativity, and may feel that paying licensing fees is a necessary display
of that admiration.87
But as in other contexts, the reluctance to exercise fair use can be
largely attributed to the uncertainty that surrounds the doctrine. Fearing
the threat of litigation, museum professionals have developed practices
over the last few decades that are primarily designed to avoid potential
conflict with rights holders, rather than to evaluate particular uses and
invoke fair use where appropriate.88 Litigation would involve substantial
time, money, and effort. 89 Moreover, the risks of losing would be
significant.90 It could result in a bill for monetary damages or attorneys’
fees, or in a court-ordered injunction effectively erasing the museum
professional’s work from public view. 91 As such, risk-averse practices
are understandably viewed as “cost-effective business decisions” within
the museum industry.92
b. The Under-Exercise of Fair Use Entrenches a “Permissions
Culture”
The risk-averse practices of individual institutions are especially
problematic because, in the aggregate, they produce a vicious circle.93
The more frequently museum professionals at a particular institution
seek licenses “for anything and everything,” the more their peers at other
institutions come to assume that every secondary use requires a license,
and start to license everything themselves.94 As a result, a “permissions
culture” has been thoroughly entrenched in the museum industry.95 Most
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secondary uses of copyrighted material are licensed, without serious
consideration as to whether licenses are legally necessary or not.96
Once ubiquitous within an industry, these near-automatic
licensing practices acquire normative significance. They are interpreted
as the standard of acceptable behavior within a community by
community members and outsiders alike.97 Any deviation is viewed with
suspicion. In other industries, courts have interpreted nonconformity with
customary licensing practices as a factor weighing against fair use, even
when a use otherwise appears fair.98 In addition, industry gatekeepers—
such as publishers and insurers of secondary works—have been reluctant
to release works that seek to rely on fair use, even where fair use is
clearly appropriate. 99
The establishment of a permissions culture within a community
thus makes it considerably more difficult for its members to exercise fair
use. Fair use, “like a muscle, can shrink with disuse.” 100 Without a
critical mass of museum professionals willing to assert their right to
make fair use, then effectively no one can.
c. The Permissions Culture Impedes Museum Activity
Risk-averse licensing practices have already produced three
distinct losses in the museum context. First are the associated monetary
and opportunity costs.101 Significant amounts of employee and volunteer
time are devoted to obtaining licenses for the use of copyrighted
materials.102 These licenses can be extremely expensive.103 Depending on
the copyright owner and the intended use of the material, licensing fees
can range from a nominal sum to the tens of thousands of dollars. 104
Were all secondary uses first assessed for fairness—and were the
decision then made that licenses should not be sought for uses that are
clearly fair—museums could save themselves a considerable amount of
human and financial resources.
See id. at 24–25 (explaining that in the visual arts field “the permissions
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managing third-party copyright issues”).
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Second are the occasions when the time and effort is expended to
track down a rights holder, only for permission to be denied because a
rights holder dislikes the message of a particular project, or for the
licensing fees to be prohibitively high and the copyright owner unwilling
to negotiate.105 Hesitant to rely on fair use, museum professionals often
decide to excise the unauthorized materials, and to release their work in
an incomplete or materially different format than what was preferred.106
And lastly are the occasions when projects are not even
attempted because of knowledge about the difficulty or expense of
obtaining licenses from certain copyright owners. 107 These concerns
result in an alarming amount of self-censorship within the visual arts
field. 108 More than a third of museum professionals admit to having
avoided or abandoned a project because of the actual or perceived
inability to obtain licenses for copyrighted materials.109 As a result, there
are significant voids in scholarship in areas where licensing is
prohibitively expensive or otherwise difficult.110
Concerns about the permissions culture have taken on new
urgency in light of digital projects’ potential to stimulate widespread
interest in the arts.111 It is now possible to create virtual counterparts to
traditional exhibitions that enable remote visitors to virtually experience
the curatorial narrative.112 Works of art and archival materials otherwise
unavailable can now be made accessible through online databases, which
greatly expands the utility of these materials for scholars, artists, and the
public at large.113 Digitization also preserves these materials for future
generations.114
If existing licensing practices extend into the digital era,
however, it will almost certainly impede museums from implementing
these possibilities. 115 Digital-based projects typically require an
enormous number of images and archival materials.116 If these materials
105
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are still under copyright, then these projects will likely be unfeasible for
those unwilling to exercise their fair use rights. As Patricia Aufderheide
and Peter Jaszi write, these losses “affect not only today’s future
professionals, [but also] those worldwide who cannot obtain digital
access to inspiration that could influence and shape their artistic and
career choices.”117 This lack of access is a loss that is felt not only in the
present. It is also “the erasure of a possible future.”118

III. SHIFTING THE BALANCE TOWARD FAIR USE
Given the toll that the permissions culture takes on scholarship
and innovation in the museum context, it is in the collective best interest
of museum professionals—and ultimately the general public—to bring
compulsory licensing practices to an end.119 Shifting the balance toward
fair use would enable museums to undertake more projects to increase
public access to the arts, and to do so at a higher speed and lower cost.120
This cultural shift, however, is not likely to occur unless the largest
inhibitor to the effective exercise of fair use—uncertainty—is
significantly reduced.121

A. A Context-Specific Test Case is Unlikely to Emerge
The present record of fair use litigation in museums and the
visual arts is sparse.122 Since fair use is a context-specific doctrine, this
contributes to the uncertainty that surrounds its application. 123 A “test
case” that produced clear rules for the application of fair use in museums
would undoubtedly resolve much of this uncertainty, and would enable
museum professionals to exercise their fair use rights with greater
confidence.124
But as Aufderheide and Jaszi conclude, such a scenario is
“simply wishful thinking.” 125 It is unlikely that a rights holder would
litigate an uncertain fair use question, as even if a rights holder were
ultimately successful, a close case could reveal the utility of fair use and
undermine his future interests.126 Moreover, fair-use decision-making is
highly fact sensitive. It is thus improbable that a single case would yield
117
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a decision that could serve as a useful guide for all future museum
activities. 127 There is also an underlying collective action problem at
work.128 A test case would undoubtedly benefit museums as a whole.129
But no single institution would likely receive such a large benefit that it
would be worth incurring the potential costs of litigation on its own.130
As such, conflicts with rights holders will likely continue to be resolved
through less costly private compromises between individual rights
holders and museums, and no test case will emerge.

B. The College Art Association’s Code of Community-Based Best
Practices May Provide Improved Fair Use Certainty
Greater certainty can also be achieved through the development
of codes of “best practices” for fair use. Such codes—which already have
been adopted in other creative and academic communities—translate fair
use principles into more understandable terms tied to the activities of its
members.131 Because the costs of production are dispersed throughout the
entire community, these codes are able to overcome the collective action
problem that otherwise prevents the resolution of fair use uncertainty.132
The College Art Association released the Code of Best Practices
for Fair Use in the Visual Arts in February 2015.133 It parallels similar
codes developed in other creative communities. 134 It pertains to the
practices of museum professionals, as well as other members of the
visual arts profession, including art historians, artists, educators, and
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scholarly publishers. 135 It describes common activities within the
museum and visual arts community where its members agree that the
exercise of fair use is appropriate.136 It then defines the boundaries of fair
use in those situations, providing users of copyrighted materials with
useful principles on which to rely when invoking fair use.137
1. An Overview of the Relevant CAA Code Principles
Three of the five principles are especially relevant to the
activities of museum professionals: (1) general museum uses, (2) online
access in memory institutions, and (3) analytic writing. 138 These
principles provide that museum professionals may exercise fair use when
engaging in many routine industry activities. The first principle–general
museum uses—provides that museum professionals may invoke fair use
when using copyrighted materials in activities that advance their core
missions. 139 This principle would allow a museum professional, for
instance, to make fair use of an image of a work of art used in an
educational application for a smart phone.140 It applies to all copyrighted
materials—including images, text, and video—and provides that these
materials may be reproduced fairly in both print and digital media.141
It is subject to four categories of limitations. First, it is subject to
a purpose and character limitation. The use “should be justified by the
curatorial objective, and the user should be prepared to articulate that
justification.” 142 Second, it is subject to amount and substantiality
limitations. The amount of the copyrighted work used “should be
appropriate to the analytic or educational purpose.”143 If a downloadable
image is made available online, it “should be suitable in size for fullscreen projection or display on a personal computer or mobile device, but
generally not larger.” 144 Third, it is subject to oversight and security
limitations. Images should not be made available for download “unless a
135

Id. at 5.
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id. at 7-8. The other two principles, which are less likely to be implicated by
the activities of most museum professionals, are making art and teaching about
art in a classroom setting. Id.
139
Id. Broadly speaking, “[t]he mission of all art museums is to serve the public
through art and education.” Am. Ass’n. of Museum Dirs., ART MUSEUMS,
PRIVATE COLLECTORS, & THE PUBLIC BENEFIT (2007), https://aamd.org/sites/
default/files/document/PrivateCollectors3.pdf.
140
For an explanation of the fairness of such a use, see supra Part 0.0.
141
CAA CODE, supra note 12 at 7-8.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id.
136

78

PUTTING FAIR USE ON DISPLAY

[Vol. 15

special justification is present,” and all materials “should be associated
with all appropriate and reasonably available metadata.”145 Fourth, it is
subject to limitations stemming from various sensitivities in the visual
arts communities. Images “should be “accompanied by attribution of the
original work as is customary in the field, to the extent possible,” and all
materials should be reproduced at a “level of fidelity . . . appropriate to
the analytic or educational purpose.”146 Lastly, the reproduction of any
material “should honor institutional policies designed to protect noncopyright interests of third parties, including the privacy of individuals
and the cultural sensitivities of communities.”147
The second principle—online access in memory institutions—
provides that museum professionals may invoke fair use to make
copyrighted materials available online, as well as to make “digital
preservation copies” for the museum’s own purposes.148 This principle
applies to “art-related documentation” materials that are not subject to
use restrictions imposed by donation agreements. 149 It includes such
materials as sketches, manuscripts, and book collections of artists and
collectors.150
This principle is subject to essentially the same limitations as
general museum uses.151 But there is greater emphasis on user oversight:
the limitations provide that a website should inform users that all
materials are provided only for personal and scholarly use, and that it
should disclaim any liability for downstream uses of these materials.152
Additionally, it provides that these websites should advertise “a point of
contact for further information and correspondence.”153 These additional
limitations are likely attributable to the relative ease with which digital
materials can be copied and reproduced.
The third principle—analytic writing—provides that museum
and visual arts professionals may invoke fair use when reproducing
copyrighted materials in analytic writing about art. 154 This principle
applies both when the copyrighted materials are the “specific subjects of
analysis,” as well as when the materials “are used to illustrate larger
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points about artistic trends and tendencies.”155 It applies to writings made
available in either print or digital formats.156
This principle is subject to limitations that closely parallel the
limitations associated with the previous two principles. 157 There is
increased emphasis, however, that the analytic objective of these writings
“should predominate over that of merely representing the work or works
used.” 158 The limitations also caution that digital uses should be
considered especially carefully because of the “heightened risk that
reproductions may function as substitutes for the originals.”159
2. The Likely Impact of the CAA Code on Fair Use in the Museum
Industry
The development of community-based codes of best practices
can be tremendously beneficial for users of copyrighted materials.
Through their limited focus on principles of fair use relevant to a
particular community, these codes can make the doctrine more accessible
and less abstract than more general discussions of fair use.160 As a result,
community members are able to exercise their fair use rights with greater
confidence.
Codes of best practices, however, are not without their concerns.
First, these codes are often formulated without input from all relevant
stakeholders. 161 They usually reflect a consensus among users of
copyrighted materials within a particular community, with little to no
input from rights holders with countervailing interests.162 The CAA Code
is no exception. It was created through discussions between artists,
museum professionals, and other users of copyrighted materials within
the visual arts community.163 Representatives from rights managements
groups—whose core business is to license images of works of art—were
notably absent.164
Generally speaking, rights holders are presumably excluded from
these discussions because of the actual or perceived difficulty of
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achieving a consensus between rights holders and secondary users.165 But
when agreement to common principles is not even attempted, it raises
serious concerns about whether these statements appropriately define the
boundaries of fair use. 166 One-sided codes risk partiality. Formulated
without serious opposition from those with countervailing interests, they
are more likely to reflect interpretations of the law that advance their
authors’ preferred allocation of rights, rather than a moderate and widely
agreed upon interpretation of copyright law. In turn, more friction is
likely to result between rights holders and secondary users when the
principles these codes put forward are ultimately put in action. Although
the CAA Code accurately reflects fair use case law, its invocation
nevertheless hazards exactly this sort of resistance from rights holders.
Rights holders—who depend on licensing fees for income—can be
expected to push back to avoid the short-term revenue loss that the more
frequent invocation of fair use is likely to cause.
Second, codes of best practices do not always significantly
clarify principles of fair use. In an effort to avoid being overly restrictive,
they frequently do little more than restate the statutory fair use factors.167
This is true of several of the CAA Code’s principles. For example, its
purpose and character limitation in the context of general museum uses
provides that a use “should be justified by the curatorial objective, and
the user should be prepared to articulate that justification.” 168 This
limitation merely contextualizes the question underlying the first
statutory factor, without resolving what sort of curatorial objective
justifies making fair use of copyrighted material. Such limitations do not
unduly narrow the appropriate boundaries of fair use. But neither do they
offer museum professionals with significant guidance in applying fair
use. These vague limitations could be improved through the inclusion of
illustrative examples. This could be done either through a formal
revision, or through the creation of an online forum that offers further
guidance to members of the visual arts community on appropriately
implementing the Code’s principles.169
Third, codes of best practices sometimes impose additional, nonlegal burdens that stem from a community’s ethical norms rather than the
165
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actual law. 170 The CAA Code admittedly incorporates “widely and
strongly held community values” that are “not tied to language of the
Copyright Act.”171
Most of the resulting limitations are not particularly burdensome.
For example, in the context of general museum uses, the Code provides
that “images provided to the public should be accompanied by attribution
of the original work as is customary in the field, to the extent
possible.”172 This limitation, reflecting the importance of acknowledging
artistic creativity within the visual arts community, is easily satisfied. In
addition, the Code explicitly states that the use of images in this context
“should honor institutional policies designed to protect noncopyright
interests of third parties,” such as “the privacy of individuals and the
cultural sensitivities of communities.”173 While the right to privacy is a
legal concern, cultural sensitivities are not. Such limitations could
reassure museum professionals when invoking fair use that their
behavior complies not only with the law, but also with the norms of the
visual arts community. Overall, this could make museum professionals
more inclined to adopt the Code’s principles than if such considerations
were omitted.
But some of the CAA Code’s limitations are more concerning.
Specifically, the oversight and security limitations in the general museum
context provide that digital images “should be associated with all
appropriate and reasonably available metadata,” and that “downloading
should not be facilitated unless a special justification is present.” 174
Compliance with these requirements—neither of which are strictly
required under Section 107—could complicate, or at least appear to
complicate, the creation of digital applications, webpages, and other
technologies that include copyrighted materials. This could unnecessarily
deter museum professionals from undertaking such projects.
But in its recent decision, Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., the
Second Circuit considered Plaintiff’s argument that the digitization of
copyrighted books to make them searchable on Google Books may
facilitate their pirating, thereby harming the value of their copyright.175
The court evaluated the adequacy of the security measures that Google
had put in place, and, finding them satisfactory, concluded that pirating
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was unlikely and dismissed the argument.176 That does not necessarily
indicate that an opposite conclusion would have precluded a finding of
fair use. Nevertheless, the court stated that it “might well furnish a
substantial rebuttal to the secondary user’s claim of fair use.” 177 Thus
while compliance with the Code’s oversight and security limitation may
be somewhat burdensome, it is likely a sound precaution to avoid
unintentionally overstepping the boundaries of fair use.
The CAA Code is admittedly imperfect. But its flaws are not
fatal. Moreover, many of them could be readily corrected through
revision or other retroactive steps to make its principles more usable for
museum professionals and other members of the visual arts community.
But even if corrective measures are not taken, the CAA Code is still
likely to produce positive change within the museum and visual arts
community: if nothing else, its publication signals the start of an
important conversation, of a widespread recognition of the stagnation
that the permissions culture has produced, and of a movement towards
something better. 178

CONCLUSION
The hidden costs of the permissions culture have been tolerated
in the museum community for far too long. With interest in
implementing digital technologies increasing, its slow sucking of
museum resources can no longer be ignored. Continued into the future,
the permissions culture will make many digital projects unaffordable—
impacting not only museum professionals, but also the public that they
seek to serve.
The publication of the CAA Code is an important step in
bringing the permissions culture to an end in the museum community.
But it is just one step. Ultimately, its eradication is up to museum
professionals themselves, who must reassess their licensing practices and
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act to establish fair use as the new normal.179 The CAA Code has set the
stage for them to do so. But the real endeavor of expanding access to the
arts to everyone, everywhere—which relies on fair use as but one of
many tools—remains to be done.
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